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Statutory Interpretation After Hively:
Where Will the Seventh Circuit Go?
Douglas O. Smith
Fifty years ago, when Title VII was passed, no one thought that sexual orientation discrimination
was unlawful sex discrimination. The Seventh Circuit’s decision to re-interpret Title VII challenges
traditional approaches to statutory interpretation that should put Seventh Circuit litigants on
notice of future uncertainty.

It seemed an unlikely setting for a bombshell opinion. Kimberly Hively, a part-time adjunct
professor at an Indiana community college, alleged that she was denied consideration for fulltime teaching positions, and that her part-time contract was not renewed, because of her sexual
orientation. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana had granted Ivy Tech’s
motion to dismiss, holding that Hively had not alleged employment discrimination on the basis
of sex as required by Title VII. A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit then affirmed the district court’s dismissal, citing prior precedent over many
decades in the Seventh Circuit that sexual orientation discrimination was not covered by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
Then, on April 4, 2017, in the first decision of its kind by a federal circuit court, the Seventh Circuit,
sitting en banc, rejected its precedents over the last thirty years and ruled that employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of unlawful sex discrimination under
Title VII.2 Of most long-term importance to Wisconsin lawyers may not be the holding itself, as
the split among the federal circuits no doubt means that, someday, this issue will be addressed
by the United States Supreme Court. (Ivy Tech has publicly announced that it will not seek a writ
of certiorari in this case.) Rather, the Seventh Circuit’s approach to statutory interpretation laid
out in the Hively opinions will likely have more long-term impact. In the Seventh Circuit, do
statutes mean what they say, or does their meaning change as society changes? This article will
highlight the approaches to landmark statutory interpretation laid out in Hively and identify
questions raised by the decision and its opinions.
The majority opinion
Writing for the court, and in light of what the opinion called “the Supreme Court’s authoritative
interpretations” of Title VII, “not what someone thought it meant one, ten, or twenty years ago,”
Chief Judge Diane Wood said that the court was “tak[ing] a fresh look at our position in light of
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developments at the Supreme Court extending over two decades.”3 Overruling “a line of this
court’s cases,”4 the majority called the issue before the court “a pure issue of statutory
interpretation.”5 After highlighting various techniques used in statutory interpretation,6 the
majority opinion then concluded that none of them were of help in interpreting the statute
because “it is simply too difficult to draw a reliable inference” from them.7
Rather, the court turned to other US Supreme Court precedents, in particular Oncale v.
Sundowner Services, Inc.,8 a unanimous opinion written in 1998 by Justice Antonin Scalia. In
Oncale, the Court concluded that Title VII covered same-sex harassment of a sexual nature. The
majority opinion quoted language from Oncale that said that “statutory prohibitions often go
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”9 The
majority also pointed to the Obergefell decision of the Court in 201510 and the now “paradoxical
legal landscape in which a person can be married on Saturday and then fired on Monday for just
that act.”11
Relying on these cases, as well as Loving v. Virginia,12 the majority ultimately concluded that “the
essence of [Hively’s] claim is the plaintiff would not be suffering adverse action had…her sex,
race, color, national origin, or religion been different.” Consequently, the majority said that
sexual orientation discrimination is a kind of sex discrimination, in much the same way that the
US Supreme Court had previously determined that same-sex harassment and gender
stereotyping harassment were forms of sexual harassment covered by Title VII.13
Judge Posner’s concurrence
The concurrence from Judge Richard Posner indicates, however, that amending the meaning of
Title VII was exactly what the court was doing. Judge Posner first outlines “three flavors” of
statutory interpretation. The first involves “extract[ing]…the original meaning of the statute,”
which is done by focusing on the exact words used.14 The second involves determining the
“unexpressed intent” of the statute, and he quoted Blackstone to say that “where words bear
either, none, or a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little deviate from
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the perceived sense of them.”15 Finally, “and most controversially,” Judge Posner says that
interpretation “can mean giving a fresh meaning to a statement (which can be a statement found
in a constitutional or statutory text)—a meaning that infuses the statement with vitality and
significance today.”16
In Judge Posner’s view, Title VII invites an “interpretation that will update it to the present, a
present that differs markedly from the era in which the Act was enacted.” Calling this “judicial
interpretative updating,” Judge Posner gives a series of examples to illustrate how he believes
that this has occurred in connection with Title VII since its enactment.17 He concludes that failing
to give the word “sex” in Title VII a “broader understanding” than what it might have had in 1964
“would make the statute anachronistic, just as interpreting the Sherman Act by reference to its
nineteenth-century framers’ understanding of competition and monopoly would make the
Sherman Act anachronistic.”18 Judge Posner acknowledges that “we, who are judges rather than
members of Congress, are imposing on a half-century old statute a meaning of ‘sex
discrimination’ that the Congress that enacted it would not have accepted.”19 He defends this
action by saying that “[w]e are taking advantage of what the last half century has taught.” 20
The dissent
Judge Diane Sykes, in her dissent, argues that the court’s approach is “a judge-empowering,
common-law decision method that leaves a great deal of room for judicial discretion” and that is
not “faithful to the statutory text, read fairly, as a reasonable person would have understood it
when it was adopted. The result is a statutory amendment courtesy of unelected judges” based
on “an aggressive reading of loosely related Supreme Court precedents.”21
Judge Sykes relies primarily on what she calls “the first principle of statutory interpretation:
When a statute supplies the rule of decision, our role is to give effect to enacted text, interpreting
the statutory language as a reasonable person would have understood it at the time of
enactment.” She notes that judges are “not authorized to infuse the text with a new or
unconventional meaning or to update it to respond to changed social, economic, or political
contexts.”22 Judge Sykes distinguishes the Sherman Act, saying that “Congress has vested the
federal courts with authority to consider and make new rules of law in the common-law way”
but that Title VII is not one of these “common-law statutes.”23 She concludes that Judge Posner’s
“judicial statutory updating … cannot be reconciled with the constitutional design” and amounts
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to the courts “assum[ing] a power that is not ours[,] …at a great cost to representative
government.”24
Judge Sykes notes two other problems with the majority and concurring opinions. Congress, as
well as many states, have in other cases specifically legislated against discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation and has always used the term “sexual orientation” in addition to “sex” or
“gender.”25 Consequently, finding that “sex” means not just gender but also sexual orientation
would render such language in other statutes “needless surplusage,” contrary to a standard
canon of statutory construction.26 Finally, Judge Sykes notes that stare decisis has “’special force’
in the domain of statutory interpretation ‘for Congress remains free to alter what we have
done.’”27
Theory and principles of statutory construction
For the three judges who dissented in Hively, “[s]tatutory interpretation is an objective inquiry
that looks for the meaning of the statutory language conveyed to a reasonable person at the time
of enactment.” Further, “it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that, unless
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.”28
In fact, “[t]he hard truth … is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and
consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”29 While a full exposition of the theory of
statutory interpretation is beyond the scope of this article, two commonly recognized principles
of statutory interpretation are rejected by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hively.
The first is the “Omitted-Case Canon” of statutory interpretation discussed by Bryan A. Garner
and the late Justice Antonin Scalia in their treatise Reading Law.30 It says that “[n]othing is to be
added to what the text states or reasonably implies…That is, a matter not covered is to be treated
as not covered.”31 The authors asserted that the principle is “so obvious that it seems absurd to
recite it.”32 Yet they noted that some claim that it is “a matter not of choice but of necessity that
courts must act creatively when interpreting and applying statutes.”33
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The second is stare decisis. The authors of Reading Law concluded that the principle of stare
decisis has “special force in statutory cases. The legislature, naturally, can change a law whose
meaning the prior judicial interpretation has established. But once its meaning has been
established, that meaning cannot be changed [by judicial interpretation] ‘in light of’ a later
statute with which a different meaning would be more compatible.”34 For example, in a previous
Seventh Circuit case, the court had said that “[p]rinciples of stare decisis require that we give
considerable weight to prior decisions of this court unless and until they have been overruled or
undermined by the decisions of a higher court, or other supervening developments, such as a
statutory overruling.”35
Consequently, despite efforts by the Hively majority to suggest otherwise, Judge Posner’s
concurrence highlights the adoption by the Seventh Circuit of a new canon of statutory
interpretation: where changes in the broader society warrant it, courts are free to revisit longstanding interpretations of statutory meaning.
What will future interpretations of Title VII bring?
In Obergefell, the US Supreme Court declared that “laws excluding same-sex couples from the
marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.”36 Even
though “the Court was presented with the opportunity to consider the question as one of sex
discrimination,” it “declined to do so and thus far has declined to take any opportunity to weigh
in on the question of sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.”37
Perhaps a majority on the Seventh Circuit was merely trying to nudge the US Supreme Court into
doing so with the Hively decision. Yet, in the absence of a US Supreme Court decision overturning
Hively, this new approach to statutory interpretation in the Seventh Circuit, similar to “dynamic
statutory interpretation,”38 creates many new questions.
1. How old must a precedent be to warrant a fresh look? Neither the majority opinion nor
Judge Posner’s concurrence suggest how much time must pass before a statute “invites
an interpretation that will update it to the present.”39
2. Is legislative inaction dead as a tool of statutory interpretation? The majority in Hively
supported the rejection of legislative inaction as grounds to uphold past precedents
based, in part, on a decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that
sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination under Title VI.40 The Hively court
said that this decision might have influenced Congress not to act to amend Title VII to
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include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Consequently, “we have no idea
what inference to draw from congressional inaction or later enactments…”41 The question
then becomes: How can a legislature effectively communicate that it concurs with existing
judicial precedent, or does what a legislature currently think not matter at all unless it
affirmatively acts to change back what the courts have interpreted existing statutes to
mean? And does it end there?
3. How reliably does stare decisis matter in the Seventh Circuit going forward? The Seventh
Circuit has effectively rejected not only the Seventh Circuit precedents under Title VII but
also the stare decisis principle set out in its decision in Santos. Can litigants safely rely on
stare decisis in advocating a particular statutory construction before the Seventh Circuit?
For example, the majority relied in part on Loving v. Virginia. Yet all of the Seventh Circuit
precedents on sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII were decided after Loving,
and stare decisis would have normally have prevented Loving from serving as a reason to
reject those precedents.
While the issue of sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII will only be definitively
resolved in the future, the approach to statutory construction may also be undergoing a
substantial transformation, at least within the Seventh Circuit. Litigants seeking to have the
Seventh Circuit interpret statutes should be prepared for wide-ranging arguments and
unexpected results.
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